a- Historical Conspiracies Do Not Halt Developments, They Accelerate Them
The period after 1990 represents a new process for the world, the region, the country, the PKK and myself. The actual disintegration of real socialism is also being officially acknowledged. The Soviet system is paying the price for its internal impasse and its failure to make the necessary transformations at the right time and in the right place through disintegration and dissolution. The rule that holds for every social phenomenon is being confirmed once again. The contradiction between an objective and its realization cannot be maintained by force for long. A leap forward to a higher stage, through either reform or revolution, becomes inevitable. If this cannot be achieved, internal decay and dissolution are subjected to restoration through reactionary coercion, termed fascism in our age. Restoration makes the same building appear stronger than before with new materials and ensures its endurance. But because social dynamics compel movement, these buildings become museums that cannot be lived in. The real-socialist and fascist systems, products of revolution and counterrevolution, could not escape collapse when they failed to respond to the process of normalization and persisted in refusing to make the necessary transformations. While the world witnessed the collapse of fascism at the end of the Second Great War, after 1990 it also experienced the internal disintegration and dissolution of real socialism, itself a product of that war. The process now being entered is the ascendancy of the system of democratic civilization in which both right and left converge through evolution and transformation. The principal means of solving problems will be provided through the system's prevailing criteria. On this basis, the international order is reviewing its principles and institutions and implementing arrangements that respond to the new conditions. This is the main direction of the transformation taking place worldwide. The transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century is defined largely in relation to this central phenomenon. The twenty-first century lays claim to being called the age of democratic civilization and human rights.
In the Middle East, the condition of war and peace based on a nationalism dating back a century and grown reactionary is at a complete impasse. The energy of the peoples is swallowed up by reactionary nationalist practices. Problems are not being solved; through a handful of profiteers feeding on crises, they are being turned into a way of life. As a result of extreme nonresolution, the process leads to the proliferation of more reactionary ideologies and religious-order formations.
As one of the region's principal countries, Turkey experiences this impasse most intensely, through crises that recur with increasing frequency. It can take steps neither toward a change of mentality nor toward structural transformations. The special war it has turned into a general mobilization also takes the state away from its traditional course, drawing it into a sphere of unlawful practices in which gangs proliferate.
The PKK, too, is experiencing a similar situation. Neither the change taking place worldwide nor developments within its own internal structure can be assessed concretely. Old understandings and attitudes have long since departed from its ideological, political and organizational line and are turning the organization into groups of gangs. In many spheres and areas of armed warfare, such structures, through ways of living and acting outside the rules, force the PKK toward a very different reactionary form. The center and cadres who ought to be responsible are virtually rowing in vain against the current.
Faced with these realities, my position of leadership is increasingly confined to a narrow sphere. The efforts to bring matters back onto the line and transform them, which we try to accomplish with great exertion, especially inside the country, are frustrated by the mentalities of gang formation. As in the state, the PKK, too, is effectively experiencing a period of groups outside the line. This situation leads to the most senseless actions and magnifies tragic losses and suffering like an avalanche. Intense repetition in the effort to overcome this situation also leaves the institution of Leadership without a function. This is how the most favorable environment for conspiracies and eliminations develops. From the early 1990s toward the 2000s, the fate, the conspiracy I was trying to break down, would increasingly wind its webs around me on every side.
From the early 1990s onward, the increasingly audible footsteps of internal and external conspiracies were virtually saying, "I am coming." The killing of my oldest childhood friend, Hasan Bindal, on January 25, 1990, by a supposedly accidental bullet is in fact an event concealing many secrets. This murder was a conspiracy very likely planned jointly by Sarı Baran, Mehmet Şener and Şahin Baliç in the camp administration. Had I swallowed this incident, the operation could have been completed with my elimination a very short time later. In those days I personally witnessed two official agents tasked with eliminating me say the following on Star TV in response to accusations against them, I believe in defense of Cem Ersever: "We are not unsuccessful. We could have killed him if we had wanted to; but he is wanted alive." What was displayed was an ongoing confession of this kind. There was some truth in it. Through the gangsterism that had made considerable headway within the PKK, this could easily have been accomplished. But the essence of their strategy was that I should remain alive and be eliminated after the entire organization had fallen into the gang's hands, so that control of the organization would also remain with them. The whole organization had to be seized. To achieve this, all the honest and devoted cadres they regarded as dangerous had to be destroyed in staged accidents. Şemdin, Kör Cemal, Hogir (Cemil Işık) and Şahin Baliç had, on their own scale, begun this process in 1986 with Mahsum Korkmaz's suspicious death.
It is now becoming clear that there are hundreds of honest and valuable cadres and patriotic people whom they punished either by staging accidents or under the label "he was an agent." To purge the party of its most valuable cadres and activists, they knowingly sent them to their deaths under the name of operations. For this reason they were terribly sensitive about command initiative. For the greater their command authority, the more it meant conspiracy, murder and the acquisition of power. I will not say the state as a whole, but, as remains unresolved in the Cem Ersever affair as well, there is a strong possibility that a certain circle had direct or indirect connections with this gang formation within the PKK. It is already known that, during this period, there were difficulties in bringing gang formation within the state apparatus under control. Again in this period, the KDP above all, some sections of the KUK, many tribes and people assigned special duties carried out intensive roles in this process.
The reason the process did not achieve complete success was that the gang's ringleaders were identified. Şahin Baliç's punishment by death, the flight of Sarı Baran, Mehmet Şener and Hogir, the earlier punishment of Kör Cemal and Şemdin's being brought under control greatly broke the gang's effectiveness. The great significance of the Hasan Bindal incident lies in its revealing all the gang's intentions and possible connections. Had this incident not been analyzed, Leadership would have remained in their hands and they would have tried to use it as they pleased. It is difficult to say that all of them consciously acted as agents. But some of them certainly had connections, particularly with state centers that had turned into gangs. They performed these roles not as registered agents, but through tacit understandings based on personal and family interests, a practice frequently employed among the Kurds. They were the sort who would try every method to seize organizational units. This situation resembles the Hezbollah leader's way of using the state against the PKK. Some groups within the KDP and KUK, many tribes and organizations under various names made numerous predatory gains and committed murders by this method. An important source of the profiteering called the "Apo premium" had extended, consciously or spontaneously, right into the PKK and was spreading like a disease.
My personal conviction is that gangs of this kind, which had infected the state and supposedly considered Özal and the commanders failures, had a share in the assassination attempt against Özal, Özal's death and the killing of certain commanders who had served as Commander General of the Gendarmerie; or that this possibility cannot be underestimated.
The year 1993 marks an important rupture in the history of the state and the PKK, and the widespread departure from the official line. Turgut Özal's openness to political dialogue led to his becoming a victim of forces he could not control. It is striking that, at this time, Gendarmerie Commander General Eşref Bitlis lost his life in a disputed plane crash. The subsequent avalanche of murders under the mask of Hezbollah, the evacuation of thousands of villages and the intensified operations were understood as a campaign of annihilation. The PKK's not particularly intelligent tactics could do no more than increase losses and bring the process to an impasse; the guerrillas could not be brought toward a correct understanding and practice of legitimate defense. The military and political leadership of the period had taken terror far beyond the bounds of law. The state's departure from its course had accelerated.
The most important conspiratorial assassination attempt of this period was the explosion of a car loaded with half a ton of explosives near our crowded house in Damascus on May 6, 1996. Because my telephone calls were being monitored, the car was detonated on the assumption that I was there at that hour. The conspiracy, financed by the then head of government, Tansu Çiller, with 50 million dollars from the secret discretionary fund, was extensive. The press reported that those referred to as the Susurluk gang, Mahmut Yıldırım, code-named Yeşil, certain members of a Syrian Kurdish family and the then mayor of Viranşehir were also involved in this conspiracy. During my interrogation, those acting on behalf of the military insisted that this team was irresponsible and represented neither the state nor themselves. They said that, had they wanted to, they themselves could have done the job more successfully with missiles. The existence of two different approaches within the state was already a known matter. With this incident, actions involving volunteers blowing themselves up with bombs developed. The spiral of violence escalated further.
The state's going off the rails was a development everyone followed with concern. The "One Minute of Darkness for Light" campaign was connected with this process. The state's secular character was also rapidly being eroded. The process known in history as February 28 came onto the agenda chiefly as a restoration movement. Indirectly, in the name of normalization, they were also calling on the PKK to act responsibly. We approached this with cautious positivity. This stance was adopted on the understanding that, at the very least, the slaughter of innocent people and the evacuation of areas would stop and the embargo would be limited; even if war continued, it would at least be conducted according to its rules.
The alliances that Turkey elevated to a strategic level with Israel in 1996 afforded intelligence services considerable opportunities. Israel's worldwide intelligence and control, and the designation of the PKK as a "terrorist organization," made tracking Leadership easier for Turkey. Another piece of information heard later was that, in 1996, the Greek Prime Minister after Papandreou, Simitis, and US President Clinton had reached an understanding on denying legal recognition to the PKK Leadership and handing it over if the opportunity arose. The narrowing of the legal space around the PKK was increasing further. Germany, France and Britain in particular had launched an intensive, politically motivated arrest campaign against PKK supporters.
The leaderships of the PUK and KDP of Southern Kurdistan, as the principal pillars of the anti-PKK campaign, had entered intensive relations centered on Ankara, London and Washington in 1996, similar to the alliance with Israel. They had agreed on isolating the PKK and its Leadership through northern Iraq and providing every kind of support for operations. Syria remained as the final link in the plan to eliminate the PKK and its Leadership. The psychological warfare developed against Syria, with Egypt also brought onto their side, yielded results in a short time. Syria considered submitting to these pressures and reaching an agreement on the PKK more compatible with its interests.
Before I left Syria, the approaches of a channel that provided indirect information on behalf of the army throughout the summer were noteworthy. A new process was desired, together with a meaningful ceasefire. There were realistic approaches to this matter. Undertaken with the organization's knowledge, the unilateral ceasefire experiment in late August 1998 was based on this information. But the interruption of this ceasefire halfway through could not really be understood. Had this indirect dialogue, whose positive aspect predominated and which extended as far as our exercise of the right to legitimate defense, been officially initiated, the process would have developed far more positively. I believe this situation was connected with the stages through which the February 28 process was passing.
A complete crossroads had been reached. It had become clear that we could no longer use the Middle Eastern sphere in the old way. What had to be done was either, as Leadership, to choose the mountainous area as headquarters, raise the war to a higher level and escalate urban actions, or to try to develop the search for compromise more securely under European conditions. Given the war's impasse and its reaching a kind of blind spot, the possibility that every kind of weapon would be used if I were in the mountains, and the thought that my situation would add many further burdens, it was considered appropriate not to choose this option. A war concentrated around me entailed great drawbacks in every respect. Morally, it would not have been right to make myself a burden. Moreover, the collaborationist Kurdish leaderships were open to every kind of exploitation. It was a known fact that they would make very bad use of my presence there. The Washington Agreement of September 17, 1998, was an indication of this. Although European conditions were very risky, there was some confidence in the law, however implicit, on the basis of a political, cultural and democratic understanding. But it had never been anticipated or imagined that the government in office in Greece would sink so low on the very first day, October 9, 1998, as soon as I set foot in that country.
At the end of the twentieth century, after a long process of preparation, a worldwide conspiracy and coup plan against the Kurdish people's free will was now being put into practice step by step. When we rewind the film once more and look, it will become clear that this plan had in fact been approved in the early 1990s, originating in London, and was intended to be implemented internationally. Although the Turkish dimensions of the plan are more or less known, its European and US dimensions have not been clearly understood. Unless we see its international dimension, our assessments will remain incomplete. To summarize, even at the risk of repetition:
1- Alongside its other purposes, the Palme murder was used to keep Turkey dependent on outside powers during and after the September 12 regime, and as a tool to protect it from the Kurdish freedom revolution. Palme had made Sweden, of which he was Prime Minister, a center for supporting and showing tolerance toward movements in countries such as Vietnam and South Africa. Sweden could also have become a center for the Kurdish freedom movement. Palme opposed branding the Kurdish freedom movement as terrorist. The "Kurdish trail" theory in his murder and the efforts to declare the PKK terrorist and ban it are closely connected with eliminating this positive position of Sweden. The links of NATO's Gladio organization, which was strong in Europe at the time and had not yet been exposed, with these and similar conspiracies will one day be brought to light. Immediately after the actions of August 15, 1984, following Germany's also throwing its weight behind the matter, an understanding had been reached with the Turkish government. With numerous economic benefits being offered, a process of isolation against the PKK had begun throughout Europe. The Palme provocation was one of the most important links in this process. Splitting the PKK was another development placed on the agenda. A group headed by Çetin Güngör was being made to take the lead in this direction. Kesire's provocations seemed to be bearing fruit. Many intellectuals, people such as Mahmut Baksi and Şivan Perwer, had been driven away. This cannot be explained by Turkey's efforts alone. In fact, a Europe-centered decision was being implemented. The Turkish left had long since been emasculated by this means. Similar plans were also being applied to the world's other freedom movements.
Germany's centrally directed arrests of PKK members were also a conscious part of this plan. The aim was fragmentation and bringing a significant portion under its control. During a visit by Turkish Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş to London in early 1990, an assessment of his along the lines of "Our plan has been approved" appeared in the press. It became clear that London, like Germany, would play a role in the elimination. Again in 1991, PUK Chairman Talabani secretly agreed with Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin in Vienna, the capital of Austria, to declare the PKK terrorist. This approach of Talabani's, intertwined with the positions of Germany, France and Britain, played a fundamental role in the terrorist designation. In this Europe-wide agreement, a Kurdish movement without the PKK was the objective. A Kurdish movement without the PKK was a much-needed bargaining chip they could use throughout the Middle East.
2- After 1993, following the failure of the ceasefire experiment with Özal, the tactic that came to the fore this time took the form of "Yes to the PKK, no to Apo." The failure of their wholesale opposition to the PKK, which had acquired a mass base numbering millions, and of their efforts to fragment it brought this tactical orientation to the forefront. Every state began creating "PKK cadres" according to its own purposes. Steps in this direction were taken from the Middle East to Russia and Europe.
The title "second man" was invented for Şemdin Sakık. Apo's elimination had been decided upon, and what would come after him was being calculated. To make Kani Yılmaz play a role in this direction, they drew him into a meaningless process of detention. The aim was for him to surrender and to use him as a PKK leader after possible eliminations. Moscow was working on Numan Uçar.
This could also be sensed in the positions of many states in the Middle East. The PUK and KDP had intensified their games against the PKK. A similar operation was being conducted within HADEP. While Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana and the other members of parliament who did not surrender were arrested, the DEP organization was being closed down. There was a struggle over HADEP. Kurdistan was being emptied out, and thousands of honest patriots guilty of no organizational offense were being slaughtered through terrifying methods under the mask of Hezbollah. On May 6, 1996, less than half an hour after the bombing of Leadership took place, reports originating in London were announcing to the world that Abdullah Öcalan had been killed or bombed. They knew beforehand what was being done.
3- The Israel-Turkey alliance of 1996 and Turkey's relations with Kurdish and Turkmen organizations in northern Iraq, which began at that time, fall within the same scope. The most important provision in the Washington Kurdish Autonomy Agreement of September 17, 1998, was the position against the PKK. Just as in 1925, a similar understanding had been reached as we approached 2000, in return for the long chain of concessions made by Turkey. In a sense, this meant a renewal of Lausanne. The PKK and the Kurdish freedom movement were being completely isolated, every kind of commitment was being made to take its Leadership captive, and the green light was being given for every kind of operation against the guerrillas, together with Kurdish collaborators, Israeli technology and specialist personnel. This was a plan of wholesale elimination.
Faced with comrades who had not even resolved the problem of gangs within their own ranks, who were indifferent about redeploying their forces and unable to break free of a sham style of command and administration accustomed to living cheaply off the Leadership, and faced with the extremely self-serving and panic-stricken approaches of the so-called friends, above all the Syrians and Greeks, whose true nature had still not been understood more fully, what fell to the PKK Leadership was a wary journey into the unknown. With a profound ache in the heart, the adventure of October 9, 1998 was beginning.
In assessing the departure of October 9, '98, we must analyze very rigorously and from the heart what the Middle Eastern terrain means. I spent nearly twenty years in practical activity on this terrain. I engaged in countless relationships and efforts. Developments of historical importance emerged. What nerve and spirit made these developments possible in relation to me, and how I was able to endure, must also be understood in every aspect. Many circles, above all the PKK structure, cannot show the ability to grasp the vital essence of the undertaking beyond its official appearance, which signifies nothing. It is as though they imagine that life, work and achievement took place in glory and renown within a normal progressive front. There is no such thing. Of course, explaining it through cheap commentary makes things comfortable for them. It satisfies their dogmatic conceptions of politics and organization. When this attitude is not enough, they then take refuge in traditional notions of sacredness, seeking to explain matters through my "extraordinary" personality traits and cheaply rid themselves of responsibility. That is why no one was willing to analyze the practice I lived through in all its historical, mythological, philosophical, religious and scientific meaning. Many books were written; I wrote as well. I am still not in a position to write the realities I experienced. For that, the spheres of liberation must develop. Yet many individuals and institutions, particularly those who pass themselves off as comrades, who fail to accomplish the task of understanding, for which conditions are highly favorable and which is virtually a prerequisite for their development, are in fact condemning themselves to non-development and failure through this attitude. If possible, let them make analyzing these years and what they ought to mean for the history and future of humanity, the Kurds and the Middle East their most fundamental task. For without this possibility, on the path to a free life they can neither analyze history and the age nor the concrete realities of the present to illuminate the way ahead. For now, this is the only path, and it requires understanding and putting that understanding into practice through great effort.
If I were to assess in broad strokes a small part of life in the Middle East, its aspect relating to politics and diplomacy, its definition would be this:
To emerge intact after so many years from the labyrinths laid out since the Sumerians, and to offer some gifts to the freedom of peoples, is possible through a prophetic stance and personality in the true sense. This process did not merely make me understand the institution of prophethood; in its true essence, it also showed me what kind of practice could stand up for humanity. This means the following: Every prophet is a rise in meaning within social development. However divine his language may be, his essence leads the developing society to achieve a different cultural stage in many fundamental matters, above all meaning, memory, custom, conscience, freedom and equality. The people are very perceptive and knowledgeable in this regard. I was surprised when they said, "What you are doing means work toward a new religious dispensation, a fourth religion (referring to the three great religions)." Later I understood what they meant.
Although it is said that the path to prophethood and a new religion was closed after Islam, this is a defense akin to each age interpreting itself as eternal. Without analyzing the influence of the culture of ancient religions in the Middle East on all social spheres, above all politics and ideology, and its consequences, such as virtually holding our present captive, neither can European civilization be understood nor can a meaningful struggle for internal and external freedom be waged successfully. History is enforcing its judgment. Neither can religion be analyzed nor a modern society created through superficial secularism. The results of two hundred years of nationalist renewal experiments are plain to see. It is also possible to foresee how much more suffering and destruction persistence along this path will cause, as in the Arab-Israeli impasse. The solution is to analyze the nature of history and, proceeding from there, create a possibility of freedom.
For our age, calling this movement a "fourth religion" would not be particularly meaningful. Yet defining it as a Middle Eastern Renaissance, on the basis of a dialectical development resembling the European Renaissance of the 1500s but synthesizing its own civilizational roots with the horizon of a civilization beyond capitalism, would be more meaningful and would answer a historical need. It would be an exaggeration to say we have created this. What we are trying to do is contribute to the original freedom movement of our day, in keeping with the cultural essence of these lands and by embracing the age's positive essences without falling captive to its reactionary character. I have complete faith that this will find meaning in history and become a strong and enduring current of a new departure advancing toward the goals of freedom with a torch that never goes out. Even if it has shortcomings and impurities, my hope and faith have never diminished that its strong representatives will further purify this current, give it the power of movement and reach its appropriate and realistic goals step by step. On the contrary, because this geography has gained the mental and spiritual strength it needs as much as bread, water and air, the meaning of life will break free of the impasses and darkness into which it has fallen for thousands of years, advance enthusiastically along a truer and more enlightened path and reach its goals. Creating such a meaningful life is more valuable than anything else, and its worth must be appreciated accordingly. Respect and devotion toward those whose heroism, suffering and sacrifices have no parallel in history are identical with freeing ourselves from the reality cursed by millennia and consecrating ourselves. If a new religious meaning must be assigned to this, it should be seen at this point. There is a consecration in it, and that is precisely this essence we are trying to illuminate. This defense of mine explains what a contemporary life freed from the curse and consecrated means.
My comparison of my departure from Damascus toward Europe with certain historical examples is being misinterpreted. But if history and the present move within the essence of sacredness, this resemblance is inevitable and true. Only distorted histories based on denial can obstruct the reality of the resemblance between sacred values. Even this situation is, at most, a veiling. What is real is the movement of sacrednesses in a chain.
I shall speak of the great Saint Paul, who created in particular the European branch of Christianity. At first he was hostile to the apostles. He recounts his joining the apostles through a miracle on the road to Damascus as an event that changed history. Born in Tarsus, he comes from a Jewish family. Starting from Antioch, he makes several journeys to Anatolia, Greece and Italy. He is a very great and deeply committed propagandist. Without him, Christianity could not have been carried to Europe to this extent. He was killed in Rome.
The Saint Paul cathedrals erected in his memory throughout Europe do not display such great magnificence for nothing. For at the foundation of European morality and its reaching the present stage lies the mortar of humanity laid by Saint Paul. Half of Europe means Saint Paul. His having been betrayed in many ways, and the desire to use him as an instrument of the source of negative developments as well, do not change this reality. More interesting still is the existence of many renegade and false friends alongside the good friends he encountered on Greek soil. He also complains about some friends' lack of seriousness.
My departure from Damascus on October 9, '98 brings this historical fact to mind. There are many friends. Many invitations have come from the party in power. Parliament invited me with a majority capable of changing the constitution. Before I went, the interpreter Ayfer Kaya, who had spoken to a friend named Kostas Baduvas, a former minister and still a member of parliament, had received more than ten confirmations over the telephone that I could come.
When I arrive, "friend Baduvas" is nowhere to be seen. Those who meet me are Intelligence Chief Stavrakis and Kalenderis, who plays the role of a contemporary Judas Iscariot (the apostle who informed on Jesus) and has also given himself the name Agit. Their attitudes are no different from those of the Hellenes exactly three thousand years ago. One attitude of the Hellenes that has not changed since that day is to call those outside their own circle and those who do not suit their interests barbarians, and to regard those outside their simple world as foreigners; this is a deeply rooted sentiment. Yet this approach does not express the entire reality; in one respect it may explain the emotional and moral side of the matter. Political and diplomatic realities are rather different.
The Kurdish Freedom Movement under PKK leadership is regarded as a kind of contemporary Bolshevism. Indeed, the label "rigidly Stalinist" reflects this view. Although its characteristics are very different, the approaches are similar. Official politics and the system of states do not wish to accept the PKK and the Kurdish Freedom Movement as a whole into legality. Many countries have pushed it into illegality. Germany in particular takes the lead in this. The USA is more rigid. The Middle Eastern states take the same approach. They consider the PKK absolutely outside legality. Those that are friendly adopt only a personal and unofficial approach. Syria, presented as the most protective friendly country, has never gone beyond the line of radical Arab nationalism. Since the attitude of President Hafez al-Assad as an individual is significant, we can assess it in a few sentences. In my view, given his considerable authority and the conditions he was passing through, Hafez al-Assad stood on a line between the despotic classical state and the revolutionary democratic state. He had drawn one foot of the divinely conceived state into the people. Contrary to what is supposed, he had simply placed the authoritarian and sacred state partly at the people's service. Yet it is also a fact that he essentially preserved the Sumerian priestly conception of the state. He was a Middle Eastern identity half light, half dark. He was not an enemy of the Kurdish Freedom Movement. But traditional ideology, the conception of the state, nationalism and contemporary diplomatic powers prevented his friendship. His greatest act of courage was not to be hostile simply because others wanted him to be. Yet in the final days before we parted, he had shown that he lacked the strength to overcome Egyptian President Mubarak, the Pharaoh's descendant, and the bureaucracy around him. He was not in a position to push nationalism excessively hard.
From my standpoint, what needed to be criticized was not Syria but my own position. The course of history could have been different had I left the Arab sphere in the early 1990s, or even the early 1980s. Settling in the Zagros was my most serious option. Yet there was no knowing what the approaches of Iran and the Kurdish collaborators would bring about. Secondly, there were comrades who could play this role easily and successfully. The expectation that they should exercise this right prevailed in me. Yet they proved so paltry that they showed themselves to be dwarfs who could let themselves drown even in a stream a handspan deep. They never understood the historic opportunity and service I had afforded them. They played recklessly with the possibilities like squanderers of an inheritance. They heedlessly used and squandered both themselves and my labor and patience, which represented immense value. This is the matter that most needs criticism and a demand for self-criticism. Yet I still believe it was right not to direct my departure of October 9, 1998 there. For then the war would have become personal, turning into outright vengeance. Any possible opportunity for peace and brotherhood would have been lost entirely. Although taking to the mountains had been my dream for forty years, the sole reason I was bursting with grief was that, if there were a peaceful possibility for human life and freedom even as small as a needlepoint, choosing to try it was more valuable. Even in my present coffin-like cell, the sole reason my morale remains high is that living for an honorable peace is no less valuable than a war that ennobles.
Understanding the essence of this attitude of the Simitis Government is far more important. There is a possibility that this stance had the approval of the USA and Britain, and even Germany. Again, Baduvas's complete failure to stand by his invitation is thought-provoking. He could have categorically asked me not to come. That someone who had been a minister should remain so paltry is far from comprehensible. One important possibility is that my feet were deliberately cut away from the Middle East. British Intelligence may have played a fundamental role in this. The involvement of a mixture of forces is not beyond possibility. Later developments will show the following reality: The strongest possibility is that, after drawing me to Europe and destroying my personality and honor, they planned to use me as a tame instrument in their hands in the Middle Eastern equation, above all in Turkey. As soon as I took my first step into Greece, I would understand that law, human rights and the rules of democratic society were not for me, and that their rigid political and economic interests were taken as the basis. It would not be very realistic for me to say that the attitude beginning with Greece was due to fear of Turkey or had been secured by agreement with it. On the contrary, I am convinced that, as the Western system at the highest level, led by President Clinton, they had examined Turkey's attitude long beforehand and with great precision. I must also state that they were very conscious in making the PKK and Öcalan phenomenon explode in Turkey's face in the most ideal manner and using it for their own interests. The strategy and tactic were as follows: To use both the PKK and the Kurds, and Turkey and the Turks; to make use of me to keep them, if necessary, in a blind war lasting fifty years, to go as far as having me killed at Turkey's hands, or at least to accomplish this through chauvinist reactionary circles tied to themselves. Thus binding Turkey more tightly to themselves and making the Kurds dependent on them under a dishonorable condition of asylum are assessed as the main components of the strategy. The four-month European adventure I experienced is of a nature to confirm this tendency still further.
I must state my inclination toward friendship. Even if it is a five-year-old child, once I regard someone as a friend, believing in them to the end is a trait of my character. Perhaps my greatest weakness in life (I myself do not believe this; I still believe, as though it were a superstition, that the condition of trust in friendship and comradeship must never be violated) is this kind of feeling of trust. I know that this aspect of me has been terribly exploited in the name of friendship and comradeship. But I am also certain that I must not abandon it, since it is the most fundamental human value. To me, playing games with friendship and comradeship is something like selling one's mother and wife. Thus, since the bond of friendship and comradeship received its greatest blow in the person of the twentieth century, I would become its last and most tragic victim. In this sense, I must speak of wrestling with the twentieth century. It will be highly instructive for me to explain what had happened to friendship, first in Greece and then in Russia, the second stop I went to in the name of a possible friendship.
My concentrated reflection at the end of the two journeys gave me the opportunity to analyze the Greek character, albeit to a limited extent. What I am speaking of is the dominant Greek character. Certainly its people have some distinctive characteristics different from those of the rulers. The distinctiveness of the Greek people has been a reality since the god Dionysus. They are enthusiastic and friendly. But as is seen in all the countries of the world, this character has been defeated and can do nothing but weep. All the peoples of the world are unable to stand by their friendships. But afterward they weep abundantly. They do the same when they are friends and comrades among themselves. Their separations, losses and unions are buried in tears and cheap love. Although it commands respect, this has little value. I have always looked with contempt upon respect and love that cannot protect friendship and comradeship, even if it comes from my mother. I have not shown reciprocal love and understanding. It is as though fate were saying to me, "It is not worth weeping for the friends and comrades you value so highly." What I oppose is not friendship and comradeship. On the contrary, it is the false and wretched people who cannot give them the value of victory and do not know how to be friends and comrades.
Looking at the history of the Greek ruling class, according to its modes of thought, which assumed a mythological form from the Mycenaeans in the 1600s BC onward, the god Zeus can commit every kind of scoundrelry and treachery. He can seduce any woman who crosses his path; from every part of himself, from his forehead, from his arse, he can give birth to many minor gods, above all Athena. Lies and deception are his divine characteristics. Even Homer, who believes in him, pours into his verses with sorrow how he deceived Hector, the hero of Troy. So long as it serves the interests of the Hellenists. He is rather like Jehovah, the God of Israel. Since the Hellenes and the children of Israel are the chosen people, whatever they do against the rest of humanity, that is, the barbarians, is their right, and their gods command it thus. This mythological reality will later turn into religious and political reality. One must not simply dismiss it as mythology. It is mythological realities that underlie religion and politics right down to the present day.
These mythological characteristics express how the Greek ruling class came into being. Their principal source is Sumerian mythology. It is known that the Hellenes were nourished, both mythologically and as a material society, through Anatolia, Phoenicia and Egypt. This class and national character, unchanged since that day, would stand before me in all its nakedness. It is a mentality and morality that is deceitful and deceptive, grants no value to any human being in pursuit of its interests, and considers those outside itself worthless and barbarian. The reality of humanity, the people and history that I represented had encountered a different historical, political and cultural reality incompatible with it at its core. In a sense, this was a small continuation of the East-West encounter ongoing since the Medes and Persians. The Western gate would not easily allow passage to the Eastern departure that found its representation in my person. Athens had other calculations too. Its entire approach was to make use of everyone and every method against the Turkish danger. They did not see much prospect of being able to make use of me personally, in a friendly manner, of course. They favored treating this use as "making dogs kill one another," like typical British policy. It was becoming clear that their friendship was nothing but a deception.
My unplanned departure, faced with the necessity that had arisen, was seen among the foremost priorities that needed to be tried. A crisis-ridden phase was unfolding in the process of degeneration entered after actually existing socialism. Prime Minister Primakov and President Yeltsin were major traitors to actually existing socialism. Because of economic interests and interests linked to secret, dirty intelligence, however strategic my position, it was very susceptible to being sold at that time. To expect respect for the values of freedom from those who had sold an entire Soviet system was to deceive oneself. The relations being pursued with the IMF, the USA, Israel and Turkey made it certain that an unlawful stance would be taken toward me. Yet the Duma had passed a resolution granting me the right of political asylum by 298 votes to 1. But this meant little to the despotic state. They wanted to force me to land in Cyprus via Turkey. Most probably, in cooperation, a handover could have occurred as early as those days.
This was not a choice I had made with conviction. Yet such a degenerate regime's settling over the ideals of freedom and equality, for which so much blood had been shed and suffering endured, in fact showed the profound deviation of actually existing socialism. This situation proved that it had not broken with the traditional system of exploitation and oppression, and recalled that it lagged even behind the temple socialism of the Sumerian priests. It presented an example of Russian revolutionary activity's inability to transcend the horizon of capitalism and feudalism, of state capitalism's inability to give birth to socialism, and consequently of its inability to hold its ground against contemporary liberal capitalism. Seeing this for myself led me to recognize another face of the twentieth century more clearly. The twentieth century greatly resembled a century of betrayal. The century of revolutions and freedoms had approached the year 2000, even before reaching its end, as a century not fundamentally committed to any human value and in which material self-interest held every principle captive. Its having been so bloody was evidence not of its exaltation but of its barbarism. Primitive nationalism and crude materialism ruled the whole. What was taking place was the most comprehensive counterrevolution against all humanity's ennobling qualities throughout history, qualities genuinely imbued with human rights and democracy.
We had encountered an outcome that called for revolution and counterrevolution to be defined anew. The picture I faced compelled me to approach human reality more accurately. It illuminated my comparison of principles with a way of life buried in the day-to-day. It increased my courage and awareness that I must not cling to certain symbolic molds, and that I now had to boldly tear apart the masks of god and man (which express the same reality). The idols of the twentieth century had to be broken. The individual's existence and rights had to come before society's existence and rights, or at least the optimal point between the two (a productive and free unity) had to be taken as the basis. Leaving individuality and its associated rights to capitalism's mercy was a grave error. Every collectivist outlook that did not take the individual's existence and free development as its basis was, in fact, the Sumerian priestly style and was doomed to produce ruling exploitative classes. The slogan "Everything for society" was actually a slogan of the oldest class society. "Everything for the individual," however contradictory it might seem, was the slogan of the most developed class society, capitalism. The essential path was to rely on an ideal of humanity, freedom and equality without succumbing to the slogans of the two principles. If scientific socialism was to become a reality, it had to free itself from dogmatism and temple socialism. Every struggle for the state was contrary to socialism. The search for something in its place was the essence of socialism. Even if the formula discovered was the dictatorship of the proletariat, it produced nothing but a new instrument of slavery. A political theory and practice based on overcoming the system of coercion, a freedom taking the individual as its basis from the outset, and an ideology of equality elevating society through collective labor could, through the possibilities created by science and technology, transcend the barbarism of the ruling class and give the longed-for social utopia its realistic expression.
The Moscow journey's acceleration of my ideological concentration in this direction is the most fundamental response I can offer to the memory of those who believed in the utopia of socialism and labored greatly for it. Twentieth-century Moscow had become so paltry that it had no power to bring any dream to life, even a negative one. The need to dwell on the Russian reality at least as much as the Greek reality was clear. Here too it clearly revealed itself that approaching matters by breaking certain idols was indispensable to reaching the realities.
The move toward Rome on November 12, 1998 was because it was the capital of the only country in Europe that could be visited. I arrived with the support of Member of Parliament Ramon Montaviani from the Communist Party group named "Refoundation." It coincided with the few-month period of Massimo D'Alema's Government. Its approaches zigzagged. It could display no clear approach, either political or legal. Under the weight of intense provocation by Italian big-capital circles, European countries' failure to give full support, and especially Germany's attitude of shaking its personality and imposing itself, it could not act with initiative. An attitude of brushing me off was developing. Very intense psychological pressure was established through the best-trained police groups. I was given no opportunity to leave the room. Being spirited away, or accepting very strict surveillance if I insisted on staying, was being imposed. For someone with heavy responsibilities, it was clear that he should leave at the first opportunity. The only thing they had not done was throw me out by force. Their attempts to pay many countries and arrange a place showed their real intention. No democratic legal stance would be displayed.
My intention was to draw the Kurdish question onto a democratic platform. Had support been given, it would not have been difficult for Turkey to adopt this attitude too. Evidently Europe did not favor a serious solution to the Kurdish question. Having Turkey grapple with the problem suited their interests better. This was also apparent from Greece's attitude. Politics in Europe could have brought the war to an end. This, however, did not suit the strategy of the West, including the USA. Germany's attitude was to open the road to the mountains as soon as possible. It was clear they were thinking long-term. Turmoil in the Middle East based on the Kurds suited them better. Thus my unexpected departure was a situation outside their tactics. All their preparations were based on tamed Kurdish collaborators. The existence of the PKK, and especially my own, rendered the Kurdish bargaining chip they had cultivated for decades and poured so much capital into inoperative in their hands. They would either shake me severely and reduce me to someone without a personality, or exclude me. The inclination of the USA was also taken into account in this. If I had pressed, I could have stayed. Expelling me from the center where Roman law was born would have been difficult. But the political risks of this were heavy. More dangerous tendencies of a state exerting such pressure also had to be reckoned with at every moment. Leaving at the first opportunity that arose had become a necessity for me.
The total of four months I spent in Europe's three historical capitals had revealed certain important realities. Democracy and law had no intention of granting the Kurdish will for freedom its due. Europe had no humane Kurdish policy. It was used only as an argument in its demands toward Turkey. In fact, the policies of the past two hundred years were being continued. They regarded the Kurds as the most suitable instrument in the Middle East for pressuring the rulers of Iran, Iraq and Turkey in line with their own policies. This fundamental reason underlay their failure to take a stance for an urgent solution. They needed a Kurdish phenomenon that created problems in the long term. A solution, on the other hand, would leave no material to be used.
This attitude also applied to the Kurdish collaborators in northern Iraq. A Turkey beset by problems would need them. Thus the PKK's remaining a problem at all times was very necessary to all of them for their political interests. They were thinking not of a solution with me but of people who would act as they wished and serve their long-term policies. I was seen as contrary to their two-hundred-year political perspectives. A free character and the initiative to decide independently were not something they could accept. Accepting this would mean losing many Kurdish collaborators they had nurtured for decades. Italy wanted to obtain more opportunities for investment and trade from Turkey. It could take the most radical stance for this purpose. Yet my situation, as was seen in practice, disrupted this calculation as well. Their interests were not suited to tolerating my personality. Evidently European law and democracy stopped at the boundaries of the Kurdish question. The only valid approach to the Kurds was one that cheaply exploited their labor and used them as an instrument in long-term Middle Eastern policies. Even in this respect, policy was still far from fully formed. The predominant aspect was that Europe had no formulated policy on the Kurdish question, just as on many general problems, above all the Balkans. Each state approached it only within the framework of police and intelligence, and tried to infiltrate through civil society organizations as well.
While I was in Rome and, I believe, while I was in Moscow, another power taking the keenest interest in me was MOSSAD. As if to say, "I am the foremost proprietor of the Kurdish question," it increasingly revealed that it was essentially the power developing the intelligence and surveillance network.
The USA, Israel and Britain stood as a separate wing. Europe was still fragmented. It already lacked a common policy on important problems of this kind. Britain had been taking the lead for two hundred years. A possible Kurdish policy could not be conceived without Britain. With Israel's emergence, surveillance was conducted through MOSSAD. Alongside Barzani and Talabani, many Kurds had been tied to the system. Only the PKK's situation disrupted the system they had created and threatened the balance established. For this reason they held me responsible and confined me within a strict policy of denunciation and isolation. Their 1996 agreements with Turkey had also led them to assume operational roles. Failing to reckon with this properly was a shortcoming. Our still not taking it seriously while in Rome stemmed from our inadequacy in calculating Israel's power. It would later become clear that Israel also held Moscow in the palm of its hand concerning me. Israel's share in the principal pursuit of me and in rendering me inoperative was decisive. Of course, they conducted this together with the USA's great financial and diplomatic support. The IMF's eight-billion-dollar loan had been used to prevent me from staying in Moscow. Again, the Blue Stream Project had been extracted from Turkey for this purpose. The most despicable thing was that, without giving anything, they extracted many concessions from one another by making abundant use of my predicament. The rent-seeking system called the "Apo premium" in Turkey was also being applied on a larger scale internationally. All of Europe, Russia, the USA and finally the Kenyan bureaucrats too would receive their returns. Trading a people's demands for freedom in my person for such material interests was utterly despicable.
The psychological war was producing results in Italy. I was preparing to leave at the slightest opportunity. The peasant simplicity of Moscow representative Numan Uçar helped the conspiracy continue and deepen. The passive and irresponsible condition of Italy representative Ahmet was also far from fully understanding what was happening. All of them had long since exhausted themselves in their simple worlds. Upon leaving Italy, both Prime Minister D'Alema and I felt relieved. D'Alema had performed poorly in the test of democracy and human rights. He was timid before Italian capital. Had he been the resounding voice of law and democracy, his contribution to the history of freedom would have been unforgettable.
When I arrived in Moscow again, most probably the final act of the game had been knowingly prepared and was being played out. My removal from Italy had been accomplished through the dark forces of both sides and the naive approaches of the inadequate PKK representatives. The process was one of preparing the cross or coffin. Those in Moscow were hammering in the first nails firmly. For the first time I was encountering expressions on their faces that left no room for friendship. Clearly, the decision came from a high level and was final. They were doing their part in the known fate. Through trickery and force they put me on a cargo plane, and after a week's detention in a place like a village house, later understood to be Bishkek, the capital of Tajikistan, under the same status via Petrograd, Nagzakis, who seemed like a strange friend and was said to be a retired general, and Athens representative Ayfer arrived in a private plane, and together we set off toward Athens. The plane's connection to the state was clear. First they wanted us to land in Romania. Nagzakis claims it had been agreed with Simitis that the handover would take place there. That may be true. When I refused, we necessarily landed in Athens. The same demons of hell, Stavrakis and Kalenderis, were waiting. But this would be a day later. On the first day, I would pass through the VIP lounge just as I had arrived and spend a day in the home of Nagzakis's mother-in-law, a friendly woman of the people. I had asked her: Could Pangalos betray me? Very firmly she said, "No, there could be no better opportunity than this for the election."
Foreign Minister Pangalos resorted to an outright trick. They had sent the highest-level intelligence team to the house where he had invited me for an official meeting. In an unfriendly, threatening tone they said, "We give you until four in the morning. Otherwise we will do what we know by force." This was a hostile approach. They were showing their true faces. Clearly they had agreed beforehand. What remained was to use my continuing friendly trust and draw me to the place they wanted. Kenya had been prepared long before together with the CIA. I would understand this later. Kalenderis, whom I trusted greatly, giving his word on the honor of the Greek state, said that a solution had been found in Kenya, a place away from danger where the old Greeks were influential, within fifteen days with a South African passport prepared by the Foreign Minister. Since trust in a friend was fundamental, not accepting was impossible. There was no one beside me to give a serious warning. The interpreter Melsa, whom I could not fully understand, was acting sluggishly. She could have deciphered the falsity of their friendship. They had detained Ayfer. In fact, I had been isolated.
During this process I witnessed a few actions that sought to convey the betrayal indirectly. The driver struck the plane I was to board a hard blow. I believe this was a deliberate gesture. The plane could not take off. Yet immediately afterward, from somewhere I assume was via Switzerland, a very special plane with a non-Greek crew was waiting for me at a secret military airfield. It was highly likely to be a CIA or British intelligence plane. Before I boarded, the taxi driver went back and forth more than ten times, not wanting to reach the plane at all. I drew no conclusion from this either. I had believed so firmly that such betrayals had no place in the book of friendship that, had someone said to me at that moment, "You are being abducted," I would have snapped at them. For this had no place in the book of humanity.
Later it would become clear that everything was planned. The ambassador in Kenya, Kostulas, picked me up from the airport easily. His first words were significant. He wanted to suggest that the British and Germans might have some honor, but the Greeks had little honor or dignity. It was impossible to make sense of these words. He intended to leave me forcibly at a UN meeting. I could make nothing of this either. Later he also stopped eating with me. He tried not to sit down at all. Clearly he was passing the last days. A directive from Athens demanded that I absolutely be expelled from the embassy. Four gorillas had been sent. When we stated that we would resist, they gave up. Until morning, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Affairs, Justice and Intelligence, at ministerial level, stated over the telephone that I must be removed from the Embassy and seemed determined to cast me into the open. Kostulas went to a meeting attended by the Kenyan Foreign Minister's son, who was the Intelligence Chief, and conveyed to me as a decision that everything was known, even photographs of me had been taken, the deadline granted was February 15, and if I did not leave they would carry it out by force. If we did not leave on February 15, anything could happen, including killing. Thus leaving that day was inevitable. Staying would mean a raid, resistance and being killed under the guise of an armed clash.
Kalenderis's final great betrayal was this: "I spoke with Simitis. He gave assurances that we could go to the Netherlands via Egypt," he said. There was no option but to accept it as it was. Earlier, a journey to the Netherlands via Minsk, the capital of Belarus, had also been contemplated. In fact, this too was a setup. Most probably everything since the departure from Damascus had been directed according to a plan by the CIA, British and Greek Intelligence, the inside story of which is still not fully known. I have no doubt this plan was prepared as one of history's greatest provocations. But it is impossible for me to say I know everything about its true inside story. Only they themselves can know it. What we can do is interpret the developments that emerged correctly. They had brought the Kenyan police right into the Embassy. They openly made it felt that my not going meant a raid. The official said in a few sentences, "We do not want to shed blood in our country." Meanwhile there could have been the use of drugs and narcotics. The kitchen staff were absolutely dependent on the Embassy. My condition was rather like that of a sleepwalker. Thus there was a high probability during this process that they had used drugs in the dosage necessary to prevent me from thinking soundly. The effect of narcotics could also have been one reason I did not decipher even very plainly suspicious situations.
I noticed tall, green-eyed men, blond and brown-haired, holding automatic rifles, taking up positions around the plane I boarded. It was highly likely that these were CIA and MOSSAD operatives. It is even more likely that those who took photographs of me at the embassy were also from MOSSAD. Inside the plane, the Turkish Special Team pounced on me and pinned me to the floor. They took everything I had on me and bound every part of me tightly with tape, put the same thick tape over my eyes and left me at the back of the plane. The plane belonged to Cavit Çağlar. It was an event reflecting the character of the True Path Government. The plane landed twice. One of the places was Egypt, the other either Israel or Cyprus. When I was brought to the island by ship, it was the morning of February 16. When my eyes were first uncovered on the plane, the message I wanted to convey was this: "This success is not yours. Those who say they are acting as your friends are not behaving honestly. They want to play this game on both sides. I have never been an enemy of Turkishness. I even have blood ties to the Turks on my mother's side. Peace and brotherhood are the only right path. It is certain that from now on I shall carry on my struggle on this basis." In fact, my initial attitude was not to speak to the very end. But it immediately became clear that this attitude would cause the conspiracy to remain concealed exactly as it was. Living to expose the conspiracy was more correct. I remember that when they took me off the plane along the way and dragged me a little, and I asked, "Are you taking me to an unsolved killing?" they said, "We will not give you that chance. Shut your mouth, or we will shut it."
The first person to meet me on the island was an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel, who stated that he represented the General Staff. The essence of what he said was this: "There are many games in this affair. We want to resolve it through brotherhood. We will give no opportunity to these schemes." This was an attitude I had not much expected. I was never in a position to measure its reliability. Along with tactical deception, he might also have been expressing a policy. There was no option but to wait and see. I spent ten days in a cell under very harsh conditions. The police, MİT, the Gendarmerie and General Staff Intelligence conducted a four-way cross-interrogation. There was no crude pressure or swearing. But the spiritual and psychological atmosphere was very harsh for me. Enduring it was a miracle. For ten days I spoke in the manner I knew and found to be right. I took a stance. Some of my statements were published. Some were not. It was certain that I had encountered a different face of the state. They approached matters maturely. It was difficult for me to gauge how far they were involved in, or opposed to, the games being played. The attitude I took as my basis was to defend, from beginning to end, with faith, determination and awareness, a line that offered the peoples the opportunity for a unity of honorable peace and brotherly life. This situation did not contradict my ideological and political line. Since taking a stance against separatism and violence exceeding legitimate defense was required by my ideological line, I comfortably maintained my attitude.
The İmralı trial had no legitimate, universal foundation as required by the European Convention on Human Rights. At the heart of the affair were a grave conspiracy and abduction. The court should not have existed under these conditions. Moreover, its many aspects contrary to the Convention have also been reported to the European Court of Human Rights. What was symbolic was the performance of the public-facing part of a play that was generally outside the screenwriters and directors who had prepared it. To me, delivering my defense as a "message of democratic reconciliation and peace" was the most correct attitude. There were no suitable circumstances for a comprehensive defense in terms of time, materials or psychological readiness for preparation.
I made many statements concerning the İmralı process. I hope their essence is published unchanged in the volumes of a book. It would not be particularly meaningful for me to repeat the matters here. Moreover, this defense of mine provides the ideological, political and moral foundation of all my dialogues with the lawyers and should be regarded as complementary. Some circles, both inside and outside, wanted to destroy my attitude. This was the most dangerous situation. I continually sought to clarify these matters, which were even more important than my health and death. What was widely being circulated was propaganda to the effect that "I had made an agreement with the deep state and the General Staff, reached a compromise or surrendered." This propaganda was deliberate; both its internal and external supporters sought to conceal their true faces through it. Had there been a compromise, I would have considered it an honor to announce the situation. I always emphasized that there was no such situation. As for the ceasefire issue, I had been dwelling on it since 1993. In connection with the September 1, 1998 ceasefire I had unilaterally declared while last in Damascus, on September 1, 1999 I took withdrawal beyond the borders, as conditions allowed and for a reasonable period, as a second step on the basis of the determination to make the ceasefire more realistic. The present situation is a position in which, because of unavoidable conditions, a limited force is stationed inside and a large part outside on the basis of legitimate defense, awaiting "dialogue for democratic reconciliation and peace."
It is well known that responsibility for politics, the government and parliament not seeking a solution belongs to them, and that the present situation carries risks in every respect. Unless this situation is overcome on a positive basis, the danger of a larger and more prolonged spiral of violence engulfing the atmosphere cannot be ignored. Reconciliation is sought in giving substantive life to the concept of a "democratic and secular republic." It is well known that the Kurds have had a share in all political formations and states established by the Turks in Anatolia throughout history, and that the latest example was proven by the founding of the Republic of Turkey and the national liberation war waged before it. It is believed and hoped that a possibility of a solution will emerge if this policy of denial arising from the rebellions, which has continued in different forms to the present day, is abandoned. The Kurds' integration with the republic as free citizens and as a people, with universal legal standards also taken into account, is seen as a strategic approach.
I shall not repeat this attitude, reflected in the PKK's program, strategy and tactics for the new period, since it has been elaborated extensively in the relevant sections of my defense. It is the highest level of the state that must determine policy and attitude. This reality is envisaged as a strategic approach not only for the Kurds of Turkey but for the Kurds in all parts.
Although the reality is so clear, a significant part of the attitudes toward the PKK consists of slanders that "Apo is burying the Kurdish question in İmralı," intended to conceal the extremely ugly and treacherous faces of the circles that have been shaken and exposed. Following these very closely and holding them to account is of great importance.
This campaign of slander and defamation, conducted especially over the past ten years through the imposition of relentless betrayal, both by the collaborators of southern Kurdistan and by circles that have taken refuge in Europe, become tied to Europe in every respect, recognize no moral value and have bound their entire lives to anti-Apoism, will not save them. The PKK is there for all to see with its stance on war and peace. Its strength, martyrs and people are also there for all to see. Where are these people? They want war. Who prevents them from fighting? Whom, which power, are they serving by provoking the PKK? If they are honest, the field is open to them. Let them represent the Kurdish question in the mountains, on the plains, in the city, in the village, at home and abroad. Let them set an example by resisting to the very end, so that they prove they are not frauds and slanderers.
The southern collaborators have been living for ten years with the dream of autonomy on the PKK's back. Both the PUK and the KDP, with their subordinate and satellite forces, developed terrible attitudes against the PKK. There were two paths for them: Either to come to democratic reconciliation and peace through sincere self-criticism, or to give up the autonomy they did not deserve and which would not be realized without the PKK. The politics and diplomacy they have pursued for forty years have done more harm to the Kurdish people than four thousand years of foreign domination. At least from now on, let them learn to be honest and come to peace and democracy. Otherwise let them see that, even if the whole world comes, they will not escape their situation. Let them not forget that this is the determination of all the martyrs, comrades, the people and myself.
My İmralı process will continue in keeping with the spirit of this defense of mine. My stance is to be ready at every moment for peace and democratic reconciliation as if they were to happen tomorrow, as well as to oppose to the very end a war of annihilation that might begin with me tomorrow, and always to respond to it with faith, determination and readiness. Outside this, I have neither known life nor understand it. For those who, despite their very great inadequacies, have always offered me their hopes and devotion, understanding what this reality means in all its aspects and doing what it requires according to their circumstances is a matter of life for them too. Knowing how to remain committed and acting according to its standards is extremely important; it requires keeping one's life entirely organized and prepared for every possible kind of development.
I believe that with this defense I have given my comprehensive answer to many matters that remained incomplete and raised questions. By providing answers in the most comprehensive manner to our people and comrades, to friends from all neighboring peoples, above all the Turkish people, and from the world, concerning their expectations and at least the İmralı process that arouses so much curiosity and under whose harsh conditions I still live, I am repaying my debt. That they develop their criticisms under the same responsibility and carry out what my criticisms require is also my expectation of them and my right.
The October 9–February 15 conspiracy, an inseparable part of the colonization efforts developed against our people since the Sumerians, which came to life as the most comprehensive of conspiracies based essentially on collaborating forces and individuals appearing as friends, is far from attaining the result it wanted and planned. Transforming this conspiracy, which united all the twentieth century's traitors and collaborators under the highest imperialist will, into a historical peace in Anatolia and Mesopotamia stands as a task before our peoples and all their responsible forces. Taking ownership of this task is the only correct attitude, both for the country's strong integrity and for the substantive unity of the secular and democratic republic. This is also the path to the honorable peace, brotherhood, freedom and equality long desired throughout history.