Duran Kalkan

Leader Apo investigated the following question: if the ideology was not to be that of the nation-state, then what ideological line would develop? He researched methods of solution, concentrated on them, resolved the contradictions between ends and means, and ultimately put forward the democratic nation as the ideology for solving the problems that the nation-state could not resolve.

He defined the democratic nation, developed it, and saw the line of the democratic nation as the line of solution.

Of course, this process was painful. There were many obstacles and difficulties, and the lack of possibilities was great. Leader Apo did not have sufficient working conditions or opportunities. Taking this situation as a basis and focusing on it, there was not much work outside that could support and strengthen the Leadership in a way that would contribute to the solution. Beginning with the 7th Congress held in January 2000, the organization entered a process of change and transformation. Yet there was not much clarity or enlightenment regarding what the philosophy, ideology, organizational structure, strategy, and tactics of this change and transformation would be. On the one hand, the old had to be demolished; on the other hand, what the new would be had not yet become clear. Thus, an interim period emerged, a period marked by ambiguity and lack of clarity.

It was precisely during this period that liquidationism revived itself, revealed itself by relying on this situation, and saw it as an opportunity. It saw that the organization had destroyed the old but could not build the new, and therefore calculated: I can divert it and take it in a more contrary direction. This was done by the system of capitalist modernity; it was done by the United States. The United States, Israel, and Britain, as the powers that organized and managed the international conspiracy, did this; in fact, the CIA did it. Accordingly, they turned toward intervening in the PKK from within, and in this way revived internal liquidationism.

There had also been such a situation before August 15. When the party went abroad, it fell into a weak position; it had become detached from the country and the people, and its possibilities were limited. The overseas field was an area full of weaknesses, a slippery area; separation from the people and the country created difficulties, and the future was not clear or openly visible. In such an ambiguous environment, how did NATO intervene through Germany? It intervened by developing the provocative line, and the person called Semir led it.

In the 2002-2003 process as well, in the same ambiguous environment, there was once again an intervention by NATO and the United States. In order to develop the provocative liquidationist tendency, this line was led by Ferhat, Botan, Ebubekir, Ekrem, and others. Many other people were also involved in it and found ground for it. Because the paradigm shift had not been realized, the ideological revolution had not been realized, the crisis had not been overcome, and there was uncertainty and ambiguity. In such an environment of uncertainty and ambiguity, they imposed a shift toward becoming like the KDP. By sabotaging, corrupting, and distorting the fedai, militant, professional revolutionary line that had been formed within the PKK up to that time, they imposed KDP-ization. In essence, they imposed liquidationism.

The third leadership birth had not yet taken place; the party had not been enlightened; the cadre had not been educated and directed. But a search had begun. Through giving it a liquidationist direction, they tried to take it in the opposite direction. Just as Semir wanted to take the PKK to Germany, into NATO’s embrace, Ferhat and Botan likewise wanted to take the party to Iraq, into NATO’s embrace, into America’s embrace. The liquidationist currents were that interconnected with one another.

This state of crisis became more concrete in the autumn of 2002. When the Justice and Development Party came to power alone after the November election, even before holding its congress, this liquidationist process imposed on the PKK from within was accelerated even further. Why? Because America had brought the AKP to power, and America was also organizing the provocative, liquidationist attacks inside the PKK. By using the AKP as a tool and making it an example, just as liquidationism had been produced inside the Erbakan movement and within the National View movement under the so-called name of renewal, liquidationism was also sought to be produced inside the Apoist movement under the name of renewal. The AKP’s break from the National View movement was intended to be carried out inside the PKK as an example as well.

This also has a regional development; we cannot evaluate it only through our own views. On September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers events occurred. In 2002, the United States launched military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. In March 2003, it marched directly on Baghdad, overthrew Saddam’s administration, seized all of Iraq, and occupied it. These developments became an important military and political ground for imposing liquidationism inside the PKK. In fact, relying on the occupation of Iraq, the United States also made similar interventions against the PKK and against other states and political forces in the region that opposed the United States. Provocation was such an intervention.

Leader Apo evaluated the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, evaluated the AKP’s rise to power in Turkey, and decided to create new policies against this. After the conspiracy, on August 2, 1999, he had declared an indefinite ceasefire. This process continued in this way during 2001 and 2002. This was the fourth unilateral ceasefire process.

When the AKP came to power alone in the election of November 3, 2002, Leader Apo said: we are giving them three months of opportunity. If they develop democratization in Turkey, we will support them unconditionally. But if they do not do so, we will struggle against the AKP. The liquidationist Ferhat came out and said, “We are giving them not three months but six months,” trying to sabotage the Leadership’s plan. But Leader Apo carried out his own line. I think it was in April 2003, in a meeting with lawyers, that he announced that the old conditions had now changed, and therefore a ceasefire process in Kurdistan would no longer bring any benefit for the freedom struggle. For this reason, he announced that he was withdrawing the ceasefire call he had made on August 2, 1999.

Leader Apo had called for a ceasefire, and the organization had declared a ceasefire accordingly. When Leader Apo withdrew this ceasefire, the organization’s ceasefire was left suspended in the air. On the other hand, in the Athens Defense, he proposed that the KNK and the PKK unite and that the organization of the People’s Congress be developed as democratic confederalism. He called for the formation of the People’s Congress as the new fundamental organizational system of the new paradigm.

In order to evaluate these matters, an expanded Central Committee meeting was held at the end of July 2003. There, intensive discussions took place. Up to that time, certain military preparations had been made; the military force in the North had been changed, and a partial military force had been sent to the northern provinces. But the concentration of forces was in the South, in the Qandil area. The relocation of the headquarters to Behdinan was on the agenda. The Central meeting held at the end of the summer of 2003 discussed these issues and discussed Leader Apo’s call to withdraw the ceasefire. But the liquidationists dominated the meeting and decided to continue the ceasefire. Thus, the movement became detached from the Leadership.

The liquidationists saw the union of the PKK and the KNK and the formation of the People’s Congress as an opportunity to liquidate the PKK. Liquidationism became active. In fact, they wanted to turn the People’s Congress system into a process of carrying out an operation within the PKK that would liquidate the PKK’s ideological and cadre-based situation and transform it into a kind of KDP-ization. Preparations were made accordingly. Indeed, at the First General Assembly of the People’s Congress, held at the end of October and the beginning of November 2003, there was intense struggle over this issue.

At the July meeting, the ceasefire issue had not been decided and had been left to the General Assembly of the People’s Congress. Was the People’s Congress going to make the decision that the PKK could not make? And on the issue of war, at that? Is that possible? A professional revolutionary organization like the PKK could not make the decision. In reality, in a situation where no decision could be made, this was a matter of making the decision of liquidationism valid by spreading it out over time. Indeed, the General Assembly of the People’s Congress did not even find the opportunity to discuss these issues; there was not even such a ground. Comrade Cemal tried once or twice to bring it to the agenda, but such an atmosphere had formed that everyone said: we are not in a position to discuss this.

A new administration was emerging, the coordination was changing, and the organization was certainly experiencing a process of liquidation. Indeed, after the General Assembly, such a situation developed even more, and various different things emerged. The Science and Art Committee published a text titled “How Should the People’s Congress Be Understood?” according to its own understanding. Regarding work directed toward Turkey, practical organizational frameworks were presented on how the People’s Congress should be organized, and the European system also took this somewhat as a basis. As for the liquidationists, by spreading the process over time, they developed the gradual, step-by-step liquidation of professional revolutionism and fedai militancy, and tried to obstruct efforts of this kind.

This led to debates. Finally, as a result of the discussions conducted in March and April 2004, the situation within the organization was reflected outward. We can say that, in fact, we were not able to show the strength to obstruct and prevent liquidationism. Liquidationism was organized; America was behind it; it was using the KDP and the PUK. The cadres outside of it were individuals, isolated one by one, fragmented; everyone’s view was according to themselves, and therefore they could not develop activity. In such a situation, melting away and fragmentation were developing very rapidly.

When this danger was seen, it was gradually reflected in the press; I reflected it in a comprehensive way. In the end, I myself saw that our own strength was no longer sufficient, and that leaving it like this was finishing the organization. I thought: rather than ending slowly in this way, perhaps it may have a shock effect, but measures may develop. Therefore, I made a broader statement to the press, exposing liquidationism. Of course, this situation was reflected to the Leadership. The lawyer who had participated in the General Assembly of the People’s Congress had not given the Leadership sufficient, correct, and timely information about the General Assembly. Supposedly to prolong the time, they did not allow him to meet with the Leadership. In fact, it became clear that liquidationism wanted to create ground for itself. It later became clear that that lawyer had relations with the Turkish intelligence agency, MIT. That too was clarified afterward. The Leadership learned of the situation within the organization only through our statement and then intervened.

To be continued…