Naturally, the sections we have discussed thus far dealt mostly with special warfare in its general dimensions. It was an account that established special warfare's connection with war as warfare.

Special warfare also had legacies it inherited and strategic and tactical molds into which it settled; in the subsequent period, it too underwent a process of development according to the form taken by the war and the changes in the political conjuncture, and we described that.

In this chapter, we will now explain mainly the Kurdistanization and Turkeyization of special warfare. First, one must begin somewhere. And when beginning somewhere, these subjects also possess the quality of complementing one another—that is, of complementing what will be described later. While describing one as predominant, it may sometimes be necessary to touch on the other or, after a certain point, to explain the two together.

   When Kurdistan is considered historically, there is the reality of a Kurdistan under foreign domination after a certain stage of history. Leader APO also called this 'Hidden History.' That is, the Kurds exist, but after one stage of history they have no place in written history. Even where they do, there is a Kurd and a Kurdistan rendered indistinct. There is only a Kurdish and Kurdistan reality bearing the stamp of whichever state held dominion over it. Why do we point this out? Because what happened in subsequent periods inherited such a legacy. The place of the Republic of Turkey within this historicity also begins after a certain stage of history: the migration of the Turks from Central Asia, their settlement from the Caucasus and the fringes of Iran into Eastern Kurdistan and the area we would call the east of Northern Kurdistan, followed by waves of migration from there both into the depths of Iran and toward the Middle East. Its dimension concerning Kurdistan, however, is mainly a period we might call the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries CE. Yet relations with the Kurds in this period took the form of an alliance, because both sides faced common problems and there was a certain commonality among the opposing forces confronting them. This brought about the Kurdish-Turkish alliance. Thus the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 and Seljuk-Kurdish relations gain meaning within such a reality. In the subsequent period came the Mongols. The Seljuks disintegrated with the Mongol attacks, and central hegemony in Kurdistan consequently dissolved. Kurds following such a process attained certain opportunities to express themselves. That brief time was a period of relief. How long did it last? Later, powers struggling for hegemony in the Middle East emerged: Safavid Iran, the Ottomans, and the Mamluks of Egypt. A war was waged among them, centered on Kurdistan and the Middle East. If the actual Third World War has centered on Kurdistan and become concrete there, in Kurdistan, a similar picture existed then as well. Yet the principal actors persist: the Republic of Turkey as heir to the Ottomans, and Iran as heir to the Iranian Safavids. Different powers were added to them, including Arabs, and today still other powers have been added. Since that period, there have been struggles and forms of dominion over Kurdistan. The era that developed from this change onward signifies a process in which hidden Kurdish history continued. The nineteenth century came, with genocidal attacks in Kurdistan, and then this process continued until the 1920s—that is, until the First World War. Why have we recounted these things? Because colonialism in Kurdistan also inherited such a legacy. In an era of such a legacy, it institutionalized itself and became a system. We have elaborated on these matters somewhat, but it is useful to review them in their basic outline.

   The situation of the Republic of Turkey differs from Iran's. Iran was not harmed in the First World War and retained its existing borders. The pro-British Pahlavi family preserved its dominion within the borders of the day—which are also today's borders—through a relationship that represented Britain's interests while preserving its own system of rule. The situation of the Republic of Turkey was different. It transformed from the Ottoman Empire into a state, then came under occupation and entered a new process of state formation. But this process rose upon the remnants of the old. The state that emerged was an Ottoman residue, a state rising upon its remains. In this respect, it had an inheritance: the bureaucratic and military structure left by the disintegrated Ottoman Empire in the geography of Anatolia and Mesopotamia. State formation developed through that structure, and the statehood of the Republic of Turkey took shape within it. Different forces brought about this state formation, but they were mainly forces inherited from the Ottomans: a certain segment within the Ottoman military and civil bureaucracy, predominantly the military wing. This was the segment that played a role as the Republic of Turkey structured itself as an Ottoman residue. Within the military bureaucracy, the soldiers were generals and colonels of the Ottoman period; there was an upper stratum forming the army bureaucracy. Mustafa Kemal was one of them, as were Fevzi Çakmak, Kazım Karabekir, and İsmet İnönü. There was also the remainder of the Committee of Union and Progress. M. Kemal and his associates were already a faction within it. When the Ottomans were defeated in the war, the groups of Union and Progress based on the Enver, Cemal, and Talat triad lost influence, and the scattered cadre structure gathered around M. Kemal. In a sense, the Republic of Turkey's restructuring of itself as an Ottoman residue proceeded through this cadre. As stated, M. Kemal led a faction of Union and Progress. Why emphasize this? We made this definition because of the organization's character. It was a military bureaucracy containing Pan-Turkist, Kemalist, and even Ottomanist tendencies. There was, in fact, conflict, contradiction, and a struggle for power among them. In establishing their own rule, they did not act within the state's natural functioning; they acted instead according to whatever their interests required. On that basis, they developed and implemented policies to reach their objectives. These were not the traditional state's own laws, but laws outside them. Here emerged the phenomenon called rulelessness. Yet the rule was to make their interests dominant. In applying it, even existing laws were not regarded as obstacles; when they were, they were overcome through different methods. Certain elections held under Union and Progress, for instance, were called 'club elections.' An election was held, but everyone was made to cast the desired vote and the results were announced as they wished. One dimension of rulelessness in building their own system appeared there. Assassinations were also arranged to overcome those seen as obstacles, palace coups were carried out, and Abdülhamid could be deposed. None of these were events within a system's natural course; they expressed aspects imposed on it from outside to install a different system or power. What should these be called? In discussing special warfare and establishing the Republic of Turkey's connection with it, one must first know that it possessed such a past characteristic. It carried such a ground within itself and, although it was not called special warfare, participated in shaping the special-war character in this respect. Union and Progress had different groups. Britain emerged victorious from the war, and under its lead different forces entered Anatolia and Kurdistan. Struggles against the occupation began there. These were not waged only by Union and Progress or only by M. Kemal; others were involved. There was Çerkez Ethem, for example, whose Green Army was far stronger than M. Kemal's. Kurdish tribes in Kurdistan reacted against the occupation, and different sectors developed struggles. What did M. Kemal do? He gathered this struggle under a particular umbrella. Yet this gathering was not a unity based on voluntary compromise. Meetings and discussions took place, but the relationship of domination developed through conspiracies. Çerkez Ethem and his brother were eliminated; Ethem was forced to leave the country, and many people in the army were disabled. Thus, there was a seizure of the struggle through conspiracies. Note that conspiracy stands out here as a phenomenon. These are elements that find a place in special warfare. Meanwhile, in the First World War, the Ottomans had begun to be defeated and the Republic of Turkey had not yet formed. In such an environment, those leading its foundation began massacres against sectors of the people and cultural and religious communities they saw as obstacles before their leadership. The Armenian massacre occurred in 1915; Armenians had also suffered new massacres in the late nineteenth century. During the war, Armenians living in Kurdistan and Anatolia were deported and killed. It was intended that no one identified as Armenian remain in those lands. Similar attacks targeted Assyrians and Anatolian Greeks. Those on the Black Sea coast are called Pontians; they were an organized society there, and a massacre was perpetrated against them as well. A massacre against Kurds was carried out in Koçgiri. These massacres are practices that can be evaluated among the applications of special warfare.